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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No. 890666-CA 
v. : 
TODD DAVID WILLARD, * Category No. 2 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL 
COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS ON THE ISSUE OF 
CONSENT. 
Defendant's brief responds to the State's claim that 
the judge erred by failing to recognize that valid consent 
justifies admission of the evidence obtained after an illegal 
stop by arguing that the stop was illegal and that consent was 
not voluntary. The State has not appealed from the judge's 
decision that the roadblock stop of defendant was 
unconstitutional. It is the State's position that the evidence 
should have been admitted regardless of whether the initial stop 
was unconstitutional. This Court need not decide whether the 
roadblock was constitutional in this case. 
In arguing that his consent was involuntary, defendant 
urges this Court to adopt a version of the facts that the trial 
court apparently disbelieved. Defendant asserts that he "did not 
specifically say that it was permissible for the deputies to look 
through his car." Appellee's Brief at 7. He also claims that he 
must not have consented because the deputy could not remember his 
exact words. These facts were resolved against defendant by the 
trial court's finding that he did consent to the search. 
Defendant has not established that this factual finding was 
clearly erroneous. See State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1987); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (facts found by judge will be 
relied upon by appellate court unless clearly erroneous). 
Factual findings are clearly erroneous if they are against the 
great weight of the evidence or if the court is otherwise 
definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court was 
mistaken. J^ i. Under this standard of review, the trial judge is 
accorded the same deference that is accorded to a jury's 
determinations of the credibility of witnesses. State v. Wright, 
744 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Apparently, Judge Tibbs 
chose to believe the officer's claim that defendant consented 
rather than defendant's self-serving claim that he did not. The 
court found "that he granted the consent to search the vehicle by 
stating, 'It's all right with me.'" (T. 75). This Court should 
defer to Judge Tibbs' factual finding that defendant agreed to 
the search. 
Of course, the fact of consent does not establish 
voluntariness. Judge Tibbs did not make a specific oral or 
written finding that the consent was either voluntary or 
untainted. The State requests that this Court remand this case 
to the trial court for a determination of these issues pursuant 
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to the Utah Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Arroyo, 
137 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Utah June 28, 1990). 
Even though Judge Tibbs did not announce any conclusion 
regarding the voluntariness of defendant's consent, defendant 
argues that his consent was involuntary. In that the 
voluntariness of a consent to search is a question of fact, 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973), this 
determination would be better left to the trial court. See State 
v. Robinson, No. 890053-CA, slip op. at 9-10 (Utah Ct. App. July 
18, 1990) (in absence of specific finding by trial court on 
voluntariness of consent, case is "ordinarily remand[ed] for the 
requisite finding on voluntariness and any necessary subsidiary 
factual findings by the trial court as factfinder"). Cjf. Arroyo, 
137 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18. 
In any event, defendant mischaracterizes Deputy 
Roberts' testimony when he states that "there were eight deputies 
surrounding the defendant and his car." On cross-examination, 
defense counsel asked: 
Q He's been stopped on an interstate 
highway. There's eight policemen around and 
he appears to be looking around at the 
activity, as well as appears to have been 
frightened? 
A Yes. 
(T. 24). Later, Deputy Roberts stated that she had to step away 
from the vehicle to talk to Deputy Barney (T. 25). She also was 
asked about the number of officers who were searching: 
Q How many officers are searching at this 
point? 
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A I believe three. I don't know how many 
were actually searching, but there were about 
three other officers there. 
(T. 31). By stating that there were eight officers who 
"surrounded" his vehicle, defendant implies a much more 
intimidating situation than appears to have been the case. Even 
when Roberts agreed to the number of eight officers, she was not 
asked to agree that all of these officers who were "around" were 
"surrounding" defendant's vehicle. This testimony does not 
demonstrate that Judge Tibbs was clearly erroneous in finding 
that consent occurred. 
The subject of consent searches occurring after illegal 
stops was addressed for the first time by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Arroyo. While the Supreme Court held that this Court erred in 
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), by following 
United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 
479 U.S. 914 (1986), the Court went on to hold that a voluntary, 
untainted consent to search following a primary illegality 
renders evidence discovered in the search admissible. Arroyo, 
137 Utah Adv. Rep. 15-17. The two-pronged test to be applied is 
whether consent was voluntary and was not an exploitation of the 
prior illegality. Id. This is precisely the point argued by the 
State in its opening brief. The trial court should have 
determined whether consent was voluntary and untainted rather 
than simply concluding that it was irrelevant. 
Under the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Arroyo, the 
trial court erred in this case by suppressing the evidence based 
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upon its determination that the officer should not have detained 
defendant for the period of time necessary to ask for consent. 
See also State v. Robinson, slip op. at 8-9 (where consent issue 
was considered even though officers' continued detention and 
questioning of the defendants—which included the request for 
consent to search—was unlawful under the fourth amendment). The 
court did not determine whether the consent was "come at by 
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Arroyo, 137 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 16 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471, 488 (1963)). Rather, the court simply concluded that 
because the stop was illegal and the purpose of the stop expired 
when the officers had examined defendant's license and 
registration, the consent had no effect. This conclusion is 
tantamount to the "but for" analysis specifically rejected by the 
United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court in Wong 
Sun and Arroyo. In short, the trial court held that consent 
would not have been obtained but for the unlawful detention. 
This Court should reverse the decision of the lower court and 
remand this case for further proceedings consistent with the law 
enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court in Arroyo. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to remand this case to the trial court with instructions that 
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consent is relevant and to order that the trial court apply the 
Arroyo decision to the facts of this case. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^-C day of July, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN 
. . ' Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant were mailed, postage 
prepaid, to Robert Van Sciver, Attorney for Appellant, 321 South 
600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, this . .• day of July, 
1990. 
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APPENDIX 
R. Don Brown #0464 
Sevier County Attorney 
County Courthouse 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: 896-6812 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
TODD L. WILLARD, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
t CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
j Case No. 1122 
This matter came on for non-jury trial before the Honorable Don V. 
Tibbs, District Judge, on the 31st day of May, 1989, at 2:00 p.m. The State 
was represented by R. Don Brown, Sevier County Attorney. The Defendant was 
present and represented by Robert Van Sciver. 
Counsel for Defendant asked the Court to reconsider the Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress at the end of the State's case. The Court, having 
reconsidered the Defendant's motion, now enters its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On March 10, 1988, the Sevier County Sheriff's Department, under 
the direction of Deputy Phil Barney, was conducting a traffic roadblock at the 
Vermillion interchange of Interstate 70. The purpose of the roadblock was to 
check driver's licenses and vehicle registrations. 
Page 2--Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
State of Utah vs. Todd L. Willard 
2. The Defendant's vehicle was the first to arrive at the 
roadblock, and Deputy Sandi Roberts approached the vehicle and asked to see 
the Defendant's license and vehicle registration. 
3. The Defendant produced a valid driver's license and 
registration. 
4. Deputy Roberts then conferred with Deputy Barney and both 
officers were of the opinion that the Defendant exhibited signs of extreme 
nervousness. 
5. Deputy Roberts asked for and was given consent to search the 
vehicle. 
6. Deputy Barney then conducted a search of the vehicle and 
discovered a controlled substance. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The detention of the Defendant after the purpose of the 
roadblock in checking licenses and registrations was satisfied was 
» 
i ^ m o 
unreasonable and unconstitutional under the state and federal constitutions D yj 
2. The roadblock was not based on aAwritten policy and was nothing 
more than a .gentlemen's agreement. 
A 
3. The Defendant's Motion to Suppress should be granted. 
DATED this /f day of 4+fibf** Ux* 1989. 
ROBERT VAN SCIVER (#3319) 
Attorney for Defendant 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City# Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 322-5678 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAHr 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TODD L. WILLARD, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 1122 
This matter came on for non-jury trial before the 
Honorable Don V. Tibbs, District Judge, on the 31st day of May, 
1989, at 2 p.m. The State was represented by R. Don Brown, Sevier 
County Attorney. The defendant was present and represented by 
Robert Van Sciver. 
Counsel for defendant asked the Court to reconsider the 
defendant's motion to suppress at the end of the State's case. 
The Court, having reconsidered the defendant's motion and having 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, hereby enters 
the following: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's Motion to 
Suppress is granted, / / 
Dated this / / day of A^wst, 1989. 
IT: 
R. Don Brown #0464 
Sevier County Attorney 
County Courthouse 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: 896-6812 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
TODD L. WILLARD, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 1122 
The Court having reviewed Plaintiff's Motion for Clarification and 
having been advised that counsel for the Defendant has no objection to such 
order and finding good cause; 
The Court finds that the evidence suppressed by the order of the 
Court heretofore entered is essential to the presentation of Plaintiff's case 
and that the Court intended that the case be dismissed as a result of such 
suppression order; 
NOW THEREFORE, the above-captioned matter is ordered dismissed with 
prejudice. J( 
